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The presence of computerized agents has become pervasive in everyday live. In this paper, we examine the 
impact of agency on human bidders’ affective processes and bidding behavior in an electronic auction 
environment. In particular, we use skin conductance response and heart rate measurements as proxies for the 
immediate emotions and overall arousal of human bidders in a lab experiment with human and computerized 
counterparts. Our results show that computerized agents mitigated 1) the intensity of bidders’ immediate 
emotions in response to discrete auction events, such as submitting a bid and winning or losing an auction, and 
2) the bidders’ overall arousal levels during the auction. Moreover, agency affected bidding behavior and its 
relation to overall arousal: whereas overall arousal and bids were negatively correlated when competing 
against human bidders, we did not observe this relationship for computerized agents. In other words, lower 
levels of agency yield less emotional behavior. The results of our study have implications for the design of 
electronic auction platforms and markets that include both human and computerized actors. 
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1. Introduction 
Information technology has revolutionized markets. While a market was traditionally a place where 
people came together to trade, a large portion of today’s trading activity in markets is actually 
conducted by and with computerized trading agents. A necessary precursor to this development is the 
ubiquitous adoption of electronic markets in industry and government (Bakos, 1991). Today, electronic 
markets are pervasive and an integral part of our everyday life. Billions of transactions take place in 
electronic markets and platforms on a daily basis. They may be as small as the purchase of an 
electronic newspaper or as large as in financial and spectrum auctions. In particular, auctions are 
frequently used in electronic consumer markets (e.g., ebay.com, dubli.com, madbid.com). Regardless 
of market size, bidding, searching, matching, clearing, and settlement processes are all supported by 
IT systems designed to reduce transaction costs, increase the probability of finding trading partners, 
and support complex decision making. For the most part, society has come to accept the fact that 
humans are no longer actively performing many of these tasks. As markets have automated and 
increased their operating speeds, so have the participants in these markets. They rely on 
computerized agents to represent their interests, such as sniping agents on eBay employed “to avoid 
a bidding war” (Ariely, Ockenfels, & Roth, 2005, p. 896). 
 
In contemporary financial markets, one has a greater chance to trade with an algorithm than with a 
human being (Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan, 2014). Demonstrating the importance of 
computerized traders, Hendershott and colleagues show that algorithmic traders were responsible for 
a large increase in liquidity available on the New York Stock Exchange (Hendershott, Jones, & 
Menkveld, 2011). Taken as a whole, computerized traders presumably are responsible for over 70 
percent of the volume in U.S. stock markets (Brownlees, Cipollini, & Gallo, 2011). A subset of 
computerized traders called high-frequency traders (HFT) make up more than 40 percent of the 
trading volume on Nasdaq and have been shown to be more informed than non-HFTs (Brogaard et al., 
2014). Clearly, computerized traders play an important role in electronic markets today. As part of this 
development, they also became competitors of human traders. The research on the impact of 
computerized traders on human traders’ affective processes and behavior and on overall market 
efficiency is still in its infancy, and it is unclear how accepting market participants are of this trend. 
However, given the amount of negative public press surrounding algorithmic and high-frequency 
trading in financial markets, we can safely assume that some participants are unhappy about the 
situation (Strasbourg & Patterson, 2012). As such, we might ask how the increasing importance of 
computerized agents in electronic auctions and the degree to which users’ believe they are interacting 
with human or non-human actors (agency) influences their decision making processes. 
 
To study the impact of agency on market participants’ behavior, affective processes, and market 
efficiency, we conducted a neuroIS laboratory experiment in which participants bidded against other 
human participants in one treatment (high agency) and against computerized bidding agents in the 
other treatment (low agency). The level of agency was the only meaningful difference between 
treatments. Applying neuroIS methods was particularly insightful in this study because they allowed 
us to measure proxies for market participants’ affective processes that may partially be unconscious 
in nature. Moreover, neuroIS enabled us to assess this data at different stages of the auction process 
without having to interrupt the participants during decision making (Riedl, Davis, & Hevener, 2014a; 
vom Brocke & Liang, 2014). In particular, we measured participants’ heart rates (HR) and skin 
conductance responses (SCR) as proxies for their overall arousal and their immediate emotions. We 
combine these measures with market results to provide insights into participants’ affective processes 
during auctions and in response to discrete auction events, such as submitting a bid and winning or 
losing an auction. By capturing participants’ overall arousal and immediate emotions in different 
scenarios (human opponents/computer opponents; that is, high agency and low agency), we explore 
recent developments in electronic markets and take a step towards explaining the impact of emotions. 
 
Our results show that participants were significantly more aroused in the high-agency treatment 
(human opponents) than in the low-agency treatment (computer opponents). Moreover, participants 
submitted lower bids when they experienced higher levels of overall arousal. What is striking is that 
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the relationship between overall arousal and bidding behavior was only present in the high-agency 
condition. In the low-agency condition, in contrast, bids and overall arousal levels were lower—and 
uncorrelated. Additionally, we observed participants’ immediate emotions in response to auction 
events. Again, we found that participants exhibit stronger reactions in the high-agency condition. This 
is the first paper to study the interplay of agency, immediate emotions, overall arousal, and economic 
behavior (bidding). 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline the study’s theoretical background and 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we outline the experimental design. In Section 4, we analyze the bidders’ 
immediate emotions in response to discrete auction events and the interplay of agency, overall 
arousal, bidding behavior, and market efficiency. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the study’s 
theoretical and managerial implications and present our conclusions. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Over the past decade, the presence of computerized agents has become pervasive in everyday life 
(Fox, An, & Janssen, forthcoming). Where humans traditionally directly interacted with other humans, 
many users today interact with computerized agents. Thus, the domain of cooperative and 
competitive interactions has been extended from a purely human environment to a “mixed zone” in 
which sentient human beings and artificial agents interact. The range of experiences is captured by 
the notion of agency, which is the extent to which users believe that they are “interacting with another 
sentient human being” (Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, & McCall, 2007, p. 3). Thereby, settings in 
which users knowingly interact with computerized agents yield low agency, whereas settings in which 
users knowingly interact with other humans yield high agency (Guadagno et al., 2007). 
 
While computer agents now also play an increasingly important role in electronic auctions (Ariely et 
al., 2005; Brogaard et al., 2014), research on the impact of computer agents on the human bidders’ 
affective processes and behavior is scant. As such, with this paper, we contribute to an improved 
understanding of affective processes and behavior in electronic auctions by building on established 
research on the role of agency in different contexts of human-computer interaction. This research has 
shown that agency has a definite influence on users’ affective processes and behavior, which, in turn, 
depends on (among other factors) the type of the task and the computer agents’ behavioral realism 
(Blascovich et al., 2002; Fox et al., forthcoming; Guadagno et al., 2007; Lim & Reeves, 2010)1. In 
particular, while researchers have found that agency has an influence in the domain of 
communicative tasks (e.g., persuasive communication (Guadagno et al., 2007; Guadagno, Swinth, & 
Blascovich, 2011), self-introduction (Nowak & Biocca, 2003; von der Pütten, Krämer, Gratch, & Kang, 
2010,) and chatting (Appel, von der Pütten, Krämer, & Gratch, 2012)) and cooperative tasks (e.g., 
trading items (Lim & Reeves, 2010), bargaining (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), 
and trust games (Riedl, Mohr, Kenning, Davis, & Heekeren, 2014b)), this influence seems to be even 
more pronounced in competitive tasks (Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; Lim & Reeves, 
2010; Polosan et al., 2011; Williams & Clippinger, 2002). In the context of computer games, for 
instance, Lim and Reeves (2010) found that the differences in affective processes between high- and 
low-agency settings were particularly strong in competitive rather than cooperative interaction. 
 
Because auctions are characterized by an inherent “social competition” (Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, & 
Phelphs, 2008, p. 1849) and, thus, fall into the category of competitive tasks, we expect that agency 
also plays an important role in electronic auctions. In our study, we employ first-price sealed-bid 
(FPSB) auctions to investigate the role of agency. In FPSB auctions, each bidder submits one single 
bid without knowing the respective other bids, the highest bid wins the auction, and the winning 
bidder pays a price in the amount of their bid (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2008; Vickrey, 1961). 
Classical auction theory assumes that bidding in an auction can essentially be understood as a 
maximization of expected utility. In contrast, our study starts from the intuition that (1) bidding in an 
electronic auction also involves affective processes (i.e., experiencing intense immediate emotions 
1 In the literature, researchers who investigate agency often also consider the influence of the counterpart’s graphical representation 
(e.g., Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Appel et al., 2012; Riedl et al., 2014b; Fox et al., forthcoming). Because, one of the features of online 
auctions is that the parties “remain anonymous and transactions between parties are of an impersonal nature” (Steinhart, Kamins, 
Mazursky, & Noy, 2013, p. 48), we deliberately focus on the role of agency in an environment without graphical representations. 
We come back to this aspect in more detail in Section 5. 
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such as the joy of winning and the frustration of losing (Astor, Adam, Jähnig, & Seifert, 2013; Delgado 
et al., 2008; Ding, Eliashberg, Huber, & Saini, 2005) and competitive arousal (Ariely & Simonson, 
2003; Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005)), and that (2) these processes are influenced by agency. 
With respect to affective processes, we are particularly interested in bidders’ immediate emotions (i.e., 
short-lived subjective experiences) (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008) in response to specific auction events 
(Astor et al., 2013) and the bidders’ overall arousal (i.e., the intensity of the overall emotional state) 
during the auction process (Ku et al., 2005).2  
 
Thereby, we build on the advances in neuroIS (Dimoka, Pavlou, & Davis, 2011; Riedl et al., 2010; 
Riedl et al., 2014a; vom Brocke & Liang, 2014; vom Brocke, Riedl, & Léger, 2013) by using SCR 
measurements to assess the intensity of immediate emotions and HR measurements for overall 
arousal. NeuroIS research has demonstrated that these measures can provide novel insight into 
users’ affective processes interacting with information systems. In particular, researchers have 
recently used SCR measurements to investigate computer users’ immediate stress reactions (Riedl, 
Kindermann, Auinger, & Javor, 2013) and used HR measurements to investigate users’ overall 
arousal in the context of IS use patterns (Ortiz de Guinea & Webster, 2013) and enterprise resource 
planning systems (Ortiz de Guinea, Titah, & Léger, 2013). 
 
In summary, we investigate the interplay of agency, the bidders’ affective processes, and bidding 
behavior in an integrated approach. Figure 1 depicts our research approach. We outline the underlying 
theoretical concepts and hypotheses in detail in Sections 2.1 to 2.3. We summarize and structure 
related literature, specifically concerning experimental studies on the impact of agency on human 
affective processes and behavior, in Table 1 at the end of this section.  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
2.1. The Impact of Agency on Immediate Emotions and Overall Arousal in        
Electronic Auctions (H1 & H2) 
From an evolutionary psychology perspective, engaging in cooperative and competitive interaction with 
other conspecifics has always been an important factor in survival and overall human success (Decety, 
Jackson, Sommerville, Chaminade, & Meltzoff, 2004; Loch, Galunic, & Schneider, 2006). To succeed in 
social interactions, humans have developed a wide range of strategies, which are based both on 
cognitive (e.g., analytical and logical reasoning, perspective taking) and affective processes (e.g., 
immediate emotions, overall arousal). Because the “human brain developed at a time when only human 
beings were able to show social behavior”, these processes inherently have a strong focus on human 
counterparts (von der Pütten et al., 2010, p. 1642). To assess and predict others’ intentions, beliefs, and 
behaviors, humans make inferences about their counterparts’ mental states—a core human ability 
commonly referred to as “mentalizing” (Decety et al., 2004; Frith & Frith, 2006) or “theory of mind” 
(Polosan et al., 2011). 
 
2 The term arousal can be used to describe both the intensity of immediate emotions (phasic arousal) and the intensity of the overall 
emotional state (overall arousal). To avoid such ambiguity, we use the term arousal only to refer to overall arousal in this paper. 
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Mentalizing is the “ability to read the mental states of other agents” (Frith & Frith, 2006, p. 531). 
Gallagher et al. (2002) established that the anterior paracingulate cortex, a brain region repeatedly 
found to be activated when humans think about mental states (Frith & Frith, 2006), plays a critical role 
for mentalizing in competitive human-human interaction. The authors employed an online version of the 
game “stone, paper, scissors” and found that the anterior paracingulate cortex was only activated when 
participants believed to compete with human rather than computer opponents. The authors concluded 
that humans adapt an “intentional stance” when competing with humans, which is not the case when 
competing with computer agents. While mentalizing primarily builds on cognitive processes, such as 
perspective taking, reflecting on previously acquired knowledge about the world, and anticipating what a 
person is going to think and feel next, mentalizing also includes affective processes (Frith & Frith, 2006; 
Lim & Reeves, 2010; Polosan et al., 2011). In particular, humans seek to simulate and reenact their 
counterparts’ emotions through the brain’s mirror system to assess their affective processes and predict 
their intentions. As part of this process, the same brain regions are activated “as when we experience 
the same emotion ourselves” (cf. simulation theory, Frith & Frith, 2006, p. 531). In an electronic auction, 
for instance, bidders might try to assess their competitors’ affective processes to predict their bids. Even 
though computer agents can be designed to simulate affective processes and take on the role of “social 
actors” (Nass & Moon, 2000, p. 84; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), one must expect that 
attempting to reenact the affective processes of computer agents is less pronounced than simulating 
and reenacting those of human counterparts (Lim & Reeves, 2010; Polosan et al., 2011). As such, we 
expect affective processes to be weaker when agency is low. 
 
In addition to assessing others’ emotions, social interactions also have a direct influence on our own 
emotional states. By weighing the consequences of our actions and fostering social interactions, 
emotions “guide our actions in an adaptive fashion” (Wallin, 2007, p. 136) and enable us to take 
advantageous decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). As such, emotions are an important element of 
human decision making, particularly in social interactions. According to social comparison theory, 
engaging in social interactions with other humans leads to comparing one’s status to others’ (Festinger, 
1954). Such social comparisons can fuel overall arousal (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, & Van Yperen, 1990; 
Lim & Reeves, 2010) and trigger immediate emotions, such as envy and gloating, which serve to keep 
track of “social status” (Bault, Coricelle, Rustichini, 2008, p. 1). For instance, Bault et al. (2008) 
investigated how a lottery player’s emotions are affected by the presence of a second player. They 
found that, when only one of the players could win, the immediate emotions in response to winning and 
losing are experienced stronger than when there was no second player. Thus, even though the 
behavior of the second player had no influence on the first player’s payoffs, the second player’s 
presence introduced a social reference point that was reflected in affective processes. 
 
Computer agents, however, can hardly serve as social reference points. Due to the difference in nature, 
comparability—as one driver for social comparison processes—is hardly given (cf. Festinger’s (1954) 
third hypothesis). Also with regard to the evolutionary function of social comparison processes among 
members of a society, computer agents—even though they can, in fact, be designed to act like social 
beings and humans, in turn, have even shown social behavior towards computer agents (Nass & Moon, 
2000; Zadro et al., 2004)—are yet not equal members of the social sphere in which we live, cooperate, 
compete, and compare. In view of lacking comparability and social nature, comparing one’s own social 
status to that of a computer agent is pointless (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2008). Thus, following 
social comparison theory, overall arousal and the intensity of immediate emotions should be lower when 
humans interact with computer agents. 
 
Empirical evidence supports this line of argumentation. Sanfey et al. (2003) and Rilling, Sanfey, 
Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen (2004), for instance, found that human subjects exhibited weaker 
activation of brain regions related to emotions when receiving unfair offers from computer opponents 
rather than from human counterparts. In the context of competitive computer games, Lim and Reeves 
(2010), Weibel, Wissmath, Habegger, Steiner, and Groner (2008), and Ravaja et al. (2006) found that 
players experienced less overall arousal when playing competitive games against computer opponents 
rather than against human opponents. Interacting with humans was also reported to increase players’ 
enjoyment compared to interaction with computers (Gajadhar, Jack, and Roepstorff, 2008), whereas 
Williams and Clippinger (2002, p. 503) found that playing a Monopoly game with low agency “generated 
significantly more aggression in the participants than playing against another person”. Eastin and 
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Griffiths (2006), however, found no effects of agency on affective processes and behavior in different 
types of computer games at all. While, in principle, affective processes are essential for all social 
interactions, they seem to be of particular importance for competitive interaction (Decety et al., 2004; 
Lim & Reeves, 2010; Weibel et al., 2008); that is, where subjects strive for divergent or even mutually 
exclusive goals. Here, social comparisons can cause social competition among individuals. Hence, 
differences in affective processing between low and high agency should be particularly pronounced in 
competitive scenarios. 
 
In electronic auctions, only one bidder can win the auction while all others lose (Malhotra, Ku, & 
Murnighan, 2008). Hence, electronic auctions are characterized by an inherent “social competition” 
(Delgado et al., 2008, p. 1849). During the auction process, this social competition causes increased 
overall arousal and a “desire to win” (Malhotra et al., 2008). The immediate emotions triggered in 
response to winning or losing an auction are usually referred to as the joy of winning and the frustration 
of losing, respectively (Astor et al., 2013; Delgado et al., 2008; Ding et al., 2005)3.  Naturally, winning or 
losing an auction may cause emotions regardless of the opponents’ type (humans or computers) since, 
after all, there is money at stake. As we have determined based on mentalizing and social comparison 
theory, however, competing with computer agents yields important differences to competing with 
humans. Thus, we hypothesize that affective processes are less pronounced in settings with low 
agency and that this is also reflected in the physiological correlates of immediate emotions and overall 
arousal: 
 
H1: The intensity of bidders’ immediate emotions is lower in FPSB auctions with low 
agency than in FPSB auctions with high agency. 
 
H2: The level of bidders’ overall arousal is lower in FPSB auctions with low agency than 
in FPSB auctions with high agency. 
2.2. The Impact of Agency on Bidding Behavior (H3) 
Previous research has shown that agency can directly affect behavior (e.g., impairing performance in 
novel tasks in front of a virtual audience (Hoyt, Blascovich, & Swinth, 2003) or causing different evasive 
actions when being approached by a virtual character (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003)). 
The lack of an actual social competition in auctions with low agency might, thus, not only affect human 
bidders’ affective processes (cf. H1, H2) but, since it is inherently related to it, also their bidding 
behavior. In particular, if there is in fact a positive relationship between agency and the intensity of 
immediate emotions in response to the auction outcome, agency should also affect the utility bidders 
derive from winning or losing an auction, which, in turn, can lead to a change in bidding behavior4.  In 
general, anticipating a joy of winning an auction can be reflected in an additional expected utility and, 
hence, an extra motivation for winning the auction. In contrast, anticipating a frustration of losing can be 
reflected in an additional expected disutility and, hence, an extra motivation for not losing (i.e., again, 
winning the auction). Since these emotions are presumably more intense when there is factual social 
competition, both mechanisms should cause bidders to place higher bids (van den Bos et al., 2008) in 
settings with high agency.  
 
In behavioral economics theory, the influence of such social comparisons on the decision makers’ utility 
is captured by other-regarding or social preferences. Such preferences explicitly consider that humans 
are not only interested in their own individual gains and losses but also in the payoffs of others who 
serve as social reference points (Bault et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2008). Relative payoffs and 
interpersonal comparisons have been found to play an important role in economic behavior (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). 
 
3 Bidders may also derive negative utility when they experience the “winner’s curse”; that is, paying more for an item than it is 
actually worth because of overestimating the good’s true value (Easley, Wood, & Barkataki, 2010). Moreover, depending on the 
auction and the information provided, a bidder may also experience winner regret and loser regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 
2008). In our experiment, however, we deliberately excluded these information events and bidders knew the exact value of the 
item. Thus, winner regret, loser regret, and the winner’s curse are negligible in our study. 
4 Here, we assume that winning an auction is related to emotions with positive valence and that losing an auction is related to 
emotions with negative valence (Ding et al., 2005; Delgado et al., 2008; Astor et al., 2013). 
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Previous research has demonstrated that, due to such interpersonal comparisons (i.e., the “social nature 
of auctions”; van den Bos et al., 2008), utility derived from succeeding in peer competition may even 
outweigh the monetary incentives (Cooper & Fang, 2008), which eventually causes auction participants to 
overbid and pay more for an item than it is actually worth to them (Malhotra et al., 2008). In this sense, 
high agency causes market interaction to be seen as a “play-to-win game” (Stafford & Stern, 2002, p. 44)5 
in which “people enjoy winning—especially against their rivals—even at a price” (Malhotra et al., 2008, p. 
80). Due to this characteristic of auctions, researchers have even identified “the thrill of bidding, the 
excitement of winning, and the stimulation of beating competitors” as reasons for the popularity of auctions 
(Lee, Kim, & Fairhurst, 2009b, p. 77). Hence, the source of additional utility or disutility is attributed to 
auctions’ inherent social competition (Delgado et al., 2008). In that sense, bidders do not just buy 
commodities—they win or lose them against other bidders. Correspondingly, Ariely and Simonson (2003) 
found in an Internet survey that 76.8 percent of the survey respondents perceived other bidders as 
competitors and referred to auction outcomes as “winning” and “losing”. Palmer and Forsyth (2006, p. 236) 
concluded that “auction behavior is, thus, a socially constructed behavior”. 
 
In auctions with low agency, winning per se is less important because here the social competition does 
not exist at all or is at least less severe. Hence, we expect bidders to place lower bids in such settings. 
For the case of common value auctions, for instance, van den Bos et al. (2008) found that agency had a 
positive effect on bids. Bidders submitted significantly higher bids and were prone to the winner’s curse 
when competing against other humans but not if the opponents were computers. In the context of 
bargaining, Sanfey et al. (2003) and van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, and Aleman (2006) found that humans 
were more likely to accept unfair offers from computerized agents than from other humans (i.e., showing 
a higher tolerance towards unfavorable allocations due to lower agency). 
 
As such, we expect agency, associated with its effect on affective processes, to influence bidding 
behavior. For most bidders, winning an auction against others constitutes value in itself. This value, in 
turn, depends on the intensity of the social competition (i.e. whether the bidder competes in a setting 
with high or low agency). Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H3: In FPSB auctions with low agency, bidders place lower bids than they do in FPSB 
auctions with high agency. 
2.3. The Relationship between Overall Arousal & Bidding Behavior (H4 & H5) 
Beyond the effect of agency on overall arousal and bidding behavior, we are interested in the 
relationship between overall arousal and bidding behavior and how this relationship is affected by 
agency. Previous research has established that both affective and cognitive processes have a definite 
influence on human decision making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Depending on the situation, however, 
the influence of either affective or cognitive processes on behavior can be more pronounced (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2006). In the literature, the role of affective and cognitive processes in decision making is 
often conceptualized in “dual system” models where the affective system is characterized as fast, 
automatic, and emotionally charged, while the cognitive system is characterized as analytic, logical, and 
abstract (Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009a; Steinhart et al., 2013). Clearly, the conceptualization of such dual 
system models is “undoubtedly an oversimplification and an imprecise representation of the complex 
human mind” (Lee et al., 2009a, p. 174). The overall distinction of decision making into situations in 
which either affective or cognitive processes are more pronounced, however, is yet useful for 
investigating emotional behavior (Lee et al., 2009a). In the following paragraphs, we outline the 
theoretical basis for the moderating effect of agency on the relation of overall arousal and bidding 
behavior. We argue that, because affective processes are expected to be less intense in low agency 
auctions, the relationship between overall arousal and bidding behavior should be weaker when agency 
is low. We start by discussing traditional settings with human counterparts and, thus, high agency. 
 
5 Correspondingly, in 2007, eBay launched an advertisement campaign called “shop victoriously” that stressed the competitive 
nature of auctions with the slogan “It’s better when you win it!” (eBay.com, 2007). In addition, the platform sends emails to users 
when another user has taken over the status as currently leading bidder for a specific good from them that suggests to hit back 
with an even higher bid. 
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2.3.1. High Agency 
For such settings, researchers commonly recognize that human financial decision making tends to rely 
on affective processes more strongly when decision makers experience higher levels of overall arousal 
(Peterson, 2007). Slovic, Funicane, Peters, and MacGregor (2007) argue that humans seem to follow 
an “affect heuristic” that guides their decision making through affective processes triggered by internal 
and external stimuli. As human bidders are expected to experience higher overall arousal levels in the 
social competition of auctions with high agency (cf. H2), the assumption of affect heuristics suggests a 
marked relationship between overall arousal and bidding behavior for high-agency scenarios. 
 
Previous research has found that the relationship between arousal and decision making is twofold. On 
the one hand, situations involving risk are known to trigger arousal because they can have material 
consequences for the decision maker (Trimpop, 1994). On the other hand, arousal can also cause an 
increased willingness to take such risks to achieve higher rewards (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Rivers, 
Reyna, & Mills, 2008). The perspective of evolutionary psychology provides a rationale for this because 
“most appetitive systems in the brain, including hunger and thirst, are designed to increase motivation 
during times of opportunity” (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006, p. 88). This insight suggests a negative 
relationship between arousal and bids because arousal enhances the motivational effects of rewards 
(Rivers et al., 2008). Higher rewards or the chance on higher rewards can usually only be realized by 
either higher levels of effort or by taking more risk, respectively. For FPSB auctions with money at 
stake, arousal may be interpreted as a cue for the chance of making a profit, which is amplified and 
results in striving for winning an even higher amount. One can only increasing their potential profit 
(value of the good minus price paid) in a FPSB auction by submitting lower bids, which concurrently 
entails a lower probability of winning the auction (Vickrey, 1961)6. Thus, lower bids may actually be 
caused by higher levels of arousal. 
 
The above reasoning speaks in favor of a negative relationship between arousal and bid height. There 
are, however, also dissenting theoretical approaches. According to the competitive arousal model, 
competitive environments fuel individuals’ desire to win in a two-step process (Ku et al., 2005, Malhotra 
et al., 2008). First, factors such as rivalry, time pressure, or social facilitation induce higher overall 
arousal levels. This higher arousal then fosters the desire to win against the opponent, which 
supersedes the original goal (for instance, generating the highest possible expected profit) and, by this 
means, affects bidding behavior. Since higher bids are ceteris paribus more likely to win an auction than 
lower bids, the competitive arousal model suggests a positive relation between arousal and bid height. 
 
However, ample evidence exists for the prior line of thought that stresses the enhancing power of 
arousal on the motivational effects of rewards. Thus, the empirical observations speak in favor of a 
negative relationship between arousal and bid height (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Mano, 1994; 
Trimpop, 1994). Mano (1994), for instance, investigated the impact of arousal on the willingness-to-pay 
for lotteries and insurances and found that higher arousal was related to a higher attraction to the 
possible rewards associated with playing a lottery. Moreover, Rivers et al. (2008) reviewed decision 
making under the influence of different factors such as age, impulsivity, and arousal and found arousal 
to be an impulsivity-promoting factor. Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) show that (sexual) arousal is 
capable of increasing individuals’ subjective willingness to engage in unsafe ventures. 
 
Thus, taken as a whole, the theoretical perspective on arousal and bidding suggests a negative relation 
between arousal and bids for high agency scenarios. Therefore, we hypothesize that higher levels of 
arousal are associated with lower bids in FPSB auctions: 
 
H4: In FPSB auctions with high agency, higher overall arousal levels are related to 
lower bids. 
 
6 This particularly holds for auctions in which bidders know their exact valuation of the auctioned off commodity (e.g., independent 
private values). In other scenarios, as, for instance, in common value auctions, one also faces the danger of paying too much and 
experiencing the winner’s curse (Easley et al., 2010). In our study, however, the bidders know the valuation and, thus, the winner’s 
curse is not possible. 
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2.3.2. Low Agency 
While the tense atmosphere of socially competing with humans establishes a context that possibly 
pronounces the role of affective processes (see H1, H2, and H4), we also have reason to believe that 
the working principles of linking arousal and bidding behavior are different for low agency. First, 
because we can expect bidders’ affective processes to be less intense in auctions with low agency 
overall, relying on such lower impulses can be expected to play a less important role, too. Second, 
decision makers tend to rather rely on cognitive processes in “depersonalized” and “asocial” situations 
(Stanovich & West, 2000). As we outline above, researchers have often attributed arousal directly to 
auctions’ social competition. In absence of an actual social competition in auctions with computer 
agents, the bidders might, thus, focus on rational, analytical thinking. Based on this reasoning, we 
conjecture that low agency attenuates the relationship between arousal and bids. 
 
Previous research provides support for the argument that the social context de facto plays an important 
role in the relationship between arousal and behavior. Sanfey et al. (2003), for instance, considered 
ultimatum bargaining and found that unfair offers by humans induced stronger activation in the anterior 
insula (interpreted as the perception of negative emotions) than did those of computer agents and that 
computerized agents rejected humans’ unfair offers more often than identical unfair offers. Sanfey et al. 
do not explicitly state the effect of agency on the relation between arousal and behavior, but one can 
assume that the gradient between arousal and rejection rates is steeper for high agency. In a follow-up 
study, van't Wout et al. (2006, p. 565) further investigated this matter by considering the interplay of 
agency, arousal, and economic decisions in ultimatum games. The authors found a significant 
correlation between arousal and rejection rates for human offers, whereas there was, in fact, no such 
effect for computer offers (on subject level). Put differently, for human offers, acceptance was related to 
low skin conductance levels, whereas rejection was related to high ones. For computer offers, both 
acceptance and rejection showed intermediate and similar skin conductance levels. 
 
Based on the above reasoning and empirical indication, we hypothesize that the presence of computer 
agents mitigates the relationship between arousal and bids: 
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3. Experimental Design 
Our experiment included two treatments. First, in the high agency (HA) treatment, the participants 
interacted with only human opponents. Second, in the low agency (LA) treatment, the participants 
interacted with only computerized opponents only. The computerized bidders in the LA treatment 
replicated the bids of the human bidders. We conducted the LA treatment sessions one week after the 
HA treatment sessions. By replicating the human bids, we avoided influencing the results due to 
differences in bidding by the agents, which makes the results comparable across treatments (see van 
den Bos et al. (2008) for a similar approach). Thus, participants in the LA treatment faced the exact 
same bids from their opponents as participants in the HA treatment. Therefore, the only difference 
between treatments is that bidders knew that they were interacting with human opponents (HA) or 
computer opponents (LA). The bidders were not represented graphically. Also, to avoid order effects, 
we based our experiments on a between-subjects design (i.e., subjects either participated in the HA 
or LA treatment but not both). 
 
During the experiment, each bidder took part in a sequence of 30 FPSB auctions with two other 
bidders. The FPSB auction was particularly suited for our study because (1) it belongs to the class of 
static auctions and, thus, allowed us to maintain a high level of control with little path dependence, (2) 
we could investigate the impact of computerized agents in a scenario with little interaction, and (3) the 
FPSB auction format is frequently used in markets worldwide. In the HA treatment, we randomly 
reassigned participants to groups of three bidders before every single auction period (random 
stranger matching). Thus, a subject did not know which other participants were currently participating 
in the same auction. Each group then played a single FPSB auction independently with three bidders 
(see Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok (2008), Katok & Kwasnica (2008), and Astor et al. (2013) for 
similar approaches). After each period, we rematched the participants into different groups of three, 
which we communicated in the instructions so that participants could not gain insights about specific 
participants and carry them over to the next interaction with a specific participant. In the LA treatment, 
we matched every participant with two computerized bidding agents, which replicated the human bids 
from the HA treatment one week earlier. Here also, we rematched every participant into a different 
group with two computerized bidding agents after each auction period. 
3.1. Auction Process 
Before an auction began, the system informed each bidder  about their independent private value (IPV)  
for the commodity to be auctioned7. This IPV was independently drawn for each bidder from a uniform 
distribution with support on the discrete integer interval {11, 12, …, 109, 110} and is expressed in monetary 
units (MU). The bidders only knew that there were three bidders in each auction, their own IPV, and the 
general distribution of IPVs, which was the same for all bidders. We denote the bid of participant i by bi. 
The winning bidder i received a payoff equal to the winning bid minus their individual valuation for the 
commodity being auctioned (vi – bi). All other bidders received a payoff of zero. The equilibrium bidding 
strategy b(vi)* for bidder i in an auction with three risk-neutral bidders in total and the common distribution 
of IPVs denoted above is given by b(vi)* = (2/3) * (vi – 10) + 10 (Krishna, 2002). 
 
To exclude missed-opportunity and money-left-on-the-table effects (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 
2008), we presented the bidders with a minimal information environment in which they were neither 
informed about the highest nor the second-highest bid (van den Bos et al., 2008). At the end of an 
auction, bidders only received information on whether they had won the auction or not and their 
payoff. We did not reveal the bidders’ identities. To capture the physiological reactions to specific 
events throughout the auction process, we provided information in timed intervals of at least 
five seconds (Sanfey et al., 2003). In particular, we investigated the intensities of the bidders’ 
immediate emotions in response to three specific events in the auction process (E1, E2, and E3). 
7 The IPV model dates back to the seminal work of Vickrey (1961) and is frequently used in auction experiments (see Katok and 
Kwasnica (2008), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), and Astor et al. (2013) for similar approaches). An IPV corresponds to 
a bidder’s individual valuation of the auctioned commodity. This is private information (i.e., a bidder only knows their own IPV but 
not the IPVs of the other bidders) and the valuation is independent (i.e., knowing one’s own IPV provides no additional information 
on other bidders’ IPVs). The bidder then has to weigh their chances of winning against the nominal payoff in case of winning the 
auction, which is based on their own IPV and the available information on the distribution of the other bidders’ IPVs. 
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More specifically, we first assessed the bidders’ physiological responses to placing a bid (E1). Then, 
the bidders saw an information screen that informed them that the auction outcome would be 
revealed soon (E2). Finally, the bidders found out whether they had won or lost the auction (E3). 
Figure 2 summarizes the auction process. 
 
 
Figure 2. Auction Process and Timed Intervals Between Auction Events 
3.2. Procedure 
Altogether, 27 female and 93 male participants (six participants per session, 120 in total, mean age = 
23.16 years) participated in 20 sessions. There were 12 sessions in the HA treatment, and eight 
sessions in the LA treatment (NHA = 72, NLA = 48). We conducted the experiment at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology and in accordance with the university’s ethics guidelines. We implemented it 
by using the z-Tree environment (Fischbacher, 2007). We recruited the participants from a pool of 
undergraduate students by using the ORSEE software environment (Greiner, 2004). We offered no 
lump sum payment. The experimental currency was monetary units (MU) with 16 MU being equivalent 
to €1.00. Depending on the bidders’ individual performance, all of the gains and losses accumulated 
during the auctions went to their individual accounts, which we individually paid out in cash to the 
participants at the end of the experiment. The average payment was €16.13 (minimum = €5.88, 
maximum = €28.44). 
 
At the end of each session, we conducted the risk-aversion task by Holt and Laury (2002) to assess 
each participant’s general attitude towards taking risk. We include the recorded value as a control 
variable that takes the value 1 if a participant is risk-averse and 0 otherwise. In this task, participants 
could earn up to an additional €3.85. Each participant selected one of two lotteries from 10 different 
specifications each with a different level of risk and expected payoff. Based on how often participants 
chose the less-risky lottery, we classified them as risk averse or not risk averse. 
 
Before the first auction started, we introduced a five-minute resting period for calibration purposes 
(Riedl et al., 2014a). To ensure the participants comprehended the experiment’s rules, the participants 
then had to successfully complete a quiz regarding the experimental instructions and performed five 
practice auctions in which they did not consider gains and losses. To avoid artifacts due to body 
movements, we limited participants’ interactions with the experimental system to mouse inputs (i.e., 
they used only their dominant hand). We equipped participants with a pair of earmuffs to avoid the 
influence of background noise.  
 
During the experiment, we continuously measured the bidders’ HR and SCR. We derived HR from 
an electrocardiogram (ECG) recording device and used a lead I method with single-use electrodes 
placed on the left and right wrist (Berntson, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007). We recorded skin 
conductance by using a constant current amplifier measurement system and Ag/AgCl (silver/silver 
chloride) electrodes. We attached the electrodes to the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the 
palm of the non-dominant hand with standard electrodermal activity (EDA) electrode paste (Fowles 
et al., 1981). We conducted all the sessions within a period of two weeks with an average relative 
humidity of 53.1 percent and an average room temperature of 24.1°C (75.4°F). These values 
comply with the methodological recommendations of the Society for Psychophysiological Research 
(Fowles et al., 1981). We had to remove the physiological measurement results of 17 participants 
from the data sample because the values of either the SCR or HR measurements were outside the 
range of the measurement system or because of too much noise on the signal. Thus, we analyze a 
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data sample of 120 – 17 = 103 participants (NHA=64 (51 male, 13 female), NLA=39 (29 male, 10 
female)). We analyze allocation efficiency, however, based on an auction level and, therefore, 
include the bids of all 120 participants. 
3.3. Physiological Measures 
The two correlates used in our study, HR and SCR, are proxies for activation of the autonomous 
nervous system (ANS) and provide insight into the bidders’ affective processes during the auctions. 
Note that there are further neuroIS measures available that can provide valuable insight into bidders’ 
affective processes, such as fMRI, electroencephalography, electromyography, pupil diameter 
measurement, and others (Dimoka et al., 2011; Riedl et al., 2014a; vom Brocke & Liang, 2014). While 
each of these approaches has distinct advantages, we focus on HR and SCR because these 
measures (1) provide insights into participants’ immediate emotions and overall arousal; (2) require 
little measurement overhead and can, thus, be assessed for several participants simultaneously, 
which is a necessary prerequisite for interactive economic experimentation; and (3) are measurable 
unobtrusively because they do not demand electrodes attached to the face or the scalp (such as with 
electroencephalography, electromyography, startle reflex), so that participants can better focus on the 
experimental tasks and act in a more habitual way. 
 
HR is a measure that reflects the activity of both the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of 
the ANS (Berntson et al., 2007). In this study, we measure HR in beats per minute and use it as a 
proxy for the overall arousal of the participants before they place a bid. In particular, we use the 
bidders’ average increase in HR (θHR) six to three seconds before they placed a bid relative to the 
individual baseline level of HR during the five-minute resting period (see Smith and Dickhaut (2005) 
and Adam, Krämer, and Weinhardt (2012) a similar approach). Thus, an arousal parameter of x% in 
this context means that a participant’s HR in the time frame of six to three seconds before submitting 
a bid was on average x% higher than in the initial calibration phase. This normalization makes θHR 
comparable across participants and treatments. We do not include the last three seconds before bid 
submission in computing θHR because previous research has found that participants exhibit 
deceleratory HR responses in this time frame due to their preparing for imminent action (Jennings, 
van der Molen, & Brock, 1990). 
 
In contrast, SCR is a measure that directly reflects only the activity of the sympathetic nervous 
system (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Dawson, Schell, & Courtney, 2011). Skin conductance is 
measured in microsiemens (µS) and can be broken down into tonic and phasic components. The 
tonic component reflects the general arousal level of the individual (skin conductance level, SCL); 
that is, the ongoing emotional state. In comparison to θHR, however, changes in SCL are rather 
inert, and, thus, we concentrate on θHR as a proxy for overall arousal. The phasic component of 
skin conductance represents short monophasic bursts of sympathetic activity (skin conductance 
response, SCR), which are usually elicited by an external or internal stimulation. Researchers have 
identified the amplitude of an SCR (SCR.amp) as a proxy for the intensity of immediate emotions 
and reflects short bursts of sympathetic activity (Dawson et al., 2011). In this study, we obtained the 
SCR.amp values by decomposing skin conductance into its tonic and phasic components with the 
Ledalab analysis software (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010). We used only amplitudes that occurred 
one to three seconds after each event and amplitudes greater than or equal to a value of .01 µS 
(Fowles et al., 1981). Following the recommendation of Venables and Christie (1980), we 
transformed all the SCR.amp values by log(x+1). 
4. Results 
In this section, we present the results of our study. First, we investigate the intensities of immediate 
emotions in response to discrete auction events (H1) and then continue with the bidders’ overall 
arousal levels (H2). Subsequently, we analyze the interplay of agency, overall arousal, and bidding 
behavior (H3-H5). Finally, we expand on the impact of agency on allocation efficiency. 
4.1. Immediate Emotions during the Auction Process (H1) 
In this section, we consider subjects’ SCR.amp as a measure for immediate emotions in response to 
three discrete auction events: bid submission (E1), an intermediate information screen (informing 
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subjects that the result is about to be displayed) (E2), and the auction outcome (E3). In our research 
model, we hypothesize that the intensities of such immediate emotions are mitigated when agency is 
low (H1). In the analysis, we additionally consider the impact of the IPV and the outcome role (winning 
or losing). For illustration, we group the IPV values into five categories, which Table 2 summarizes.  
 
Table 2. Value Classes 
Value class 
Value interval 
Lower bound Upper bound 
0 very low 11 30 
1 low 31 50 
2 medium 51 70 
3 high 71 90 
4 very high 21 110 
Total range  91 110 
 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 display the bidders’ average SCR.amp in response to the three auction events E1, 
E2, and E3. We group the results by value class and treatment. All of the figures indicate that 
emotional intensity was generally lower in the low-agency treatment and generally higher for higher 
value classes. The auction outcome (E3) triggered the strongest responses, whereas E1 and E2 
triggered less-intense responses. To confirm the graphical evidence, we conducted four generalized 
least squares (GLS) regressions in which we modeled each bidder’s SCR.amp in response to E1, E2, 
and E3. We used a between-subjects design as is common in experimental setups, which means that 
we compared the results of a group of subjects in one group to a different set of subjects in our 
control group. We sampled the same participants in the same treatment multiple times and accounted 
for level differences using control variables (gender and risk-aversion). We treated our subjects with 
two levels of agency; unfortunately, we could treat our subjects with every possible level of agency, 
and, therefore, we estimate a model that includes random effects to account for this. We estimated a 
GLS mixed-model that simultaneously accounted for both random effects and fixed effects. We 
conducted the regressions for each auction by using robust standard errors clustered by subject. For 
all events, we accounted for the treatment (LA: 1, HA: 0), risk aversion (1: risk averse, 0: not risk 
averse), sex (female: 1, male: 0), value class (coded as 0 to 4, squared), and arousal before bid 
submission (θHR). Note that specification (3) includes a dummy for the outcome role (winning: 1, 
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Figure 3. Average SCR.amp in Response to E1 
 
 
Figure 4. Average SCR.amp in Response to E2 
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Figure 5. Average SCR.amp in Response to E3 
  
Table 3 summarizes the results of the GLS regressions8. First, the general positive relationship 
between stakes and emotional intensity is confirmed in this setting. The coefficient of value class was 
positive, significant, and consistent for E1-E3. Thus, the intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions 
in response to salient auction events was higher for higher value classes. Second, emotions were 
stronger when bidders experienced higher levels of overall arousal (θHR). In other words, there was a 
positive relationship between overall arousal and the intensity of immediate emotions, which was 
consistent for E1-E3. Third, the differences in the intensities of the emotional responses between the 
LA and HA treatments were significant and consistent for E1-E3 (E1: b=-.015, p=.084; E2: b=-.022, 
p=.017; E3: b=-.030, p=.023), whereat the effect at E3 was stronger than at E1 and E2. Note, 
however, that the coefficient was only marginally significant for E1. In summary, our results support 
H1. The intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to salient auction events was lower 
for low agency than it was for high agency. 
 
With respect to the impact of outcome role on immediate emotions in response to E3, note that the 
bidders could lose money in our setting. Thus, the status quo was maintained when an auction was 
lost, whereas a gain was realized when an auction was won. Thus, one could expect a stronger 
emotional response to winning rather than losing an auction. The results of specification (3) confirm 
this conjecture. The coefficient on the dummy variable winner was positive and significant (b=.020, 
p=.004). Hence, the intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to the auction outcome 
was higher if the auction was won. As Figure 6 depicts, the general intensity of emotions in response 
to E3 was higher in the HA treatment and the responses were stronger for winning an auction.  
 
We did not observe an interaction effect between treatment and auction outcome.  Winning an auction 
(compared to losing) caused stronger responses across both treatments, and participants in the HA 
treatment showed stronger responses to both winning and losing the auction than the participants in the 
LA treatment. Interestingly, however, winning an auction in the LA treatment caused stronger responses 
than losing an auction in the HA treatment. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 5. 
 
 
8 Note that, with 103 participants and 30 auctions, a total number of 103 x 30 = 3090 observations would have been possible. In 23 
of these 3090 cases, however, we were not able to accurately assess the physiological data for the relevant bidding timeframe due 
to movement artifacts or due to a sudden noise on the signal. Therefore, the total number of observations was 3090 – 23 = 3067. 
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Dependent variables: SCR.amp at different events (E1-E3) 
(1) E1 (2) E2 (3) E3 (4) E3 
Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff. 
Dummy: LA treatment -.070 -.015 (.008) 
+ -.091 -.022 
(.009) 
* -.102 -.030 
(.013) 
* -.102 -.030 
(.013) 
* 
Dummy: risk averse .058 .015 (.009) 
 .031 .009 
(.012) 
 .011 .004 
(0.18) 
 .011 .004 
(0.18) 
 
Dummy: female -.095 -.023 (.009) 






** -.123 -.042 
(.014) 
** 
(Value class)² .122 .002 (<.001) *** 
.160 .003 
(<.001) 
*** .281 .007 
(.001) 
*** .331 .008 
(.001) 
*** 
Auction (#1-30) -.042 <.001 (<.001) 
* -.090 -.001 
(<.001) 
*** -.063 -.001 
(<.001) 
** -.061 -.001 
(<.001) 
** 
Overall arousal (θHR) .050 .001 (<.001) 
** .046 .001 
(<.001) 
** .044 .001 
(<.001) 
** .042 .001 
(<.001) 
** 
Dummy: winner       .067 .020 (.007) 
** .139 .042 
(.009) 
*** 
(Value class)² × winner          -.119 -.003 (.001) 
** 
Constant  .036 (.010) 
***  .061 (.014) 
***  .069 (.019) 
***  .065 (.019) 
*** 
 N = 3067 R² = .039 
N = 3067 
R² = .063 
N = 3067 
R² = .148 
N = 3067 
R² = .150 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Figure 7 displays the impact of outcome role and value class on average SCR.amp, which indicates 
that losing despite a high or very high valuation had the potential to evoke strong emotions. 
Specification (4) captures this relationship with the interaction between outcome role and value class, 
and a Wald test confirms that the increase in explanatory power from specification (3) was significant 
(χ²(1)=8.135, p<.01). The coefficient for the dummy winner was positive and significant (b=.042, 
p<.001) (i.e., at the lowest value class (coded as 0), winning caused stronger emotional responses 
than losing). The coefficient of the variable for value class was also positive and significant (b=.008, 
p<.001) (i.e., in case that an auction was not won, every increase in value class increased the 
emotional response significantly). The interaction term (winner × value class) was negative and 
significant (b=-.003, p=.004) (i.e., the just-mentioned increase was lower but still positive (.008 + (-
.003) = .005) if the auction was won). This pattern is consistent across treatments. We discuss this 
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Figure 6. Average SCR.amp in Response to E3 for Different Outcome Roles and Treatments 
   
 
Figure 7. Average SCR.amp in Response E3 for Different Outcome Roles and Value Classes 
4.2. Overall Arousal during Bidding (H2) 
In this section, we consider θHR as a measure for the bidders’ overall arousal levels before bid 
submission. When comparing the bidders’ average θHR across all auctions on a subject level, we 
observed that arousal levels were marginally higher in the HA treatment than they were in the LA 
treatment (3.07% vs. 1.42%, one-tailed t-test, t(101)=-1.635, p=.053). While this result provides some 
support for H2, note that bidding behavior for low valuations is rather different than it is for high 
valuations (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2008; Kagel, 1995). 
 
In particular, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) established that, when participants think they do 
not have a realistic chance of winning an auction as is the case for low IPV, they behave aimlessly. It 
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seems that bidders realize that their probability of winning the auction in these cases is small, and, 
therefore, they even place bids in excess of their own valuation to prevent another bidder from 
making a high profit (Kagel, 1995). This phenomenon can also be seen in the SCR.amp results 
reported in the last subsection, where immediate emotions were much less intense for low valuations. 
Therefore, in the following analysis, we use only auctions with IPV equal to or higher than 60 MU (i.e., 
the upper 50% of the IPV distribution), which means that, from the series of 30 auctions a subject 
participated in, we consider on average roughly 15 auctions in the analysis. 
 
Correspondingly, Figure 8 depicts the bidders’ average θHR across all auctions in which their IPV 
was equal to or higher than 60 MU. When comparing the bidders’ θHR in those auctions, we can see 
that overall arousal levels were significantly higher in the HA treatment than in the LA treatment 
(3.92% vs. 1.79%, one-tailed t-test, t(101)=-1.920, p=.029). Thus, in line with hypothesis H2 and 
confirming the results on immediate emotions, participants were less aroused when they bidded 
against computer opponents. 
  
 
Figure 8. Average Overall Arousal (θHR) 
4.3. The Relationship between Agency, Overall Arousal and Bidding (H3–H5) 
Based on the literature, in Section 3, we hypothesize that there is a relationship between bidders’ 
arousal and bidding behavior for high agency (H4) and that this relationship is mitigated for low 
agency (H5). To test this relationship, we first analyze the Pearson correlations between arousal and 
bids grouped by treatment 9 . The analysis reveals a statistically significant negative correlation 
between arousal and bids (n=64, r=-.213, p=.046, one-tailed) in the HA treatment but no significant 
correlation between arousal and bids in the LA treatment (n=39, r=-.081, p=.313, one-tailed).  
 
The correlation analysis established a relationship between arousal and bidding behavior in human 
opponent markets in a simple setting. While compelling, the previous results may not hold up to more 
rigorous analysis. To control for other known effects on bidding behavior, we performed a mediation 
analysis based on our research model (cf. Figure 1) and test the conditional indirect effect. We 
conducted the analysis according to Krull and MacKinnon’s (2001) mediation analysis approach. We 
conducted the GLS regressions summarized in Table 4 on the level of single auctions by using robust 
standard errors clustered by subject. The independent variables were treatment (LA: 1, HA: 0), sex 
(female: 1, male: 0), bidders’ arousal (θHR), and whether or not subjects were classified as risk 
9 As we outline in Section 4.2, we based the analysis on auctions with IPV equal to or higher than 60 MU (i.e., the upper 50% of the 
IPV distribution). 
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averse (1: risk averse, 0: not risk averse) based on Holt and Laury’s (2002) questionnaire. Additionally, 
we controlled for valuations and auction sequence. 
 
Consistent with our previous analysis and, thus, providing further support for H3, specification (1) 
shows that arousal was also significantly lower in the computer opponents markets when controlling 
for auction sequence and valuation (b=-2.304, p=.028). In line with hypothesis H3, the results of 
specification (3) show that bidders placed lower bids in computer markets (b=-3.101, p=.002). Testing 
H4 and H5, we found that bidders placed lower bids when they were aroused (b=-.110, p<.001), while 
this effect was conditional on whether agency was high or low (b=.111, p=.004). Moreover, a Wald 
test confirmed that the increase in explanatory power from specification (2) to specification (3) was 
significant (χ²(2)=20.706, p<.001). Note that these results are robust against using different time 
frames (cf. Appendix A). 
 
Table 4: GLS Regression Models for Overall Arousal and Bids 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
(1) Arousal (2) Bid (3) Bid 
Beta Coeff. Betta Coeff. Beta Coeff. 
Dummy: LA treatment -.116 -2.304 (1.049) 
* -.022 -.513 
(.911) 
 -.134 -3.101 
(.991) 
** 
Dummy: risk averse -.093 -2.298 (1.219) 
+ .012 .336 
(.966) 
 .004 .130 
(.944) 
 
Dummy: female -.010 -.240 (1.344) 
 .087 2.361 
(1.022) 
* .089 2.414 
(.982) 
* 
Valuation .067 .044 (.016) 
** .844 .649 
(.016) 
*** .844 .649 
(.015) 
*** 
Auction (#1-30) -.152 -.168 (.030) 
*** .006 .008 
(.020) 
 -.004 -.005 
(.019) 
 
Overall arousal (θHR)       -.094 -.110 (.024) 
*** 
LA treatment × overall 
arousal 
      .114 .111 
(.039) 
** 
Constant  4.556 (1.805) 
*  16.515 (1.406) 
***  19.440 
(1.502) 
*** 
 N = 1506 R² = .051 
N = 1506 
R² = .726 
N = 1506 
R² = .736 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
  
Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between arousal and bids grouped by treatment. We see that, in 
the LA treatment, the average bid appeared to be completely invariant to arousal. The HA treatment 
differed markedly and exhibited decreases in average bid between low and high arousal. It appears 
as if the participants were not only more aroused when they were bidding against other humans but 
that their bidding behavior was correlated with arousal. This finding is also reflected in an interaction 
term between LA and arousal (b=.111, p=.004). To test the significance of this conditional indirect 
effect of arousal on bids, conditional for agency, we conducted a bootstrapping analysis. Based on 
5,000 bootstrapped samples using bias-corrected 95 percent confidence intervals, the analysis 
revealed a significant indirect effect of arousal on bids for high agency (IE=.447, SE=.072, LL=.307, 
UL=.589). LL and UL refer to the lower and upper limit of the 95 percent confidence interval. The 
indirect effect was significantly different from zero at p<.05 (two-tailed). In contrast, the corresponding 
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analysis for low agency reveals that the indirect effect was not significant (IE=-.027, SE=.489, LL=-
1.020, UL=.913). Table 5 summarizes these results. Taken as a whole, our results support H3, H4, 
and H5. In the traditional context of markets with high agency, bidders were more aroused, and this 
arousal was also directly reflected in their bids. In markets with low agency, however, bidders were 
less aroused and the indirect effect of arousal on bids disappeared. In other words, low agency 
mitigated both arousal and the relationship between arousal and behavior. At this stage, it remains 
unclear whether the mediating role of arousal was due to a causal relationship of arousal on bids or 
because bidders who placed lower bids against other human bidders were also more aroused. We 
discuss this point in more detail in Section 5. 
  
 
Figure 9. Relationship between Overall Arousal and Bids 
   
Table 5. Indirect Effects for HA and LA Treatment 
 Indirect effect Boot SE LL95%CI UL95%CI 
High agency .447 .072 .307 .589 
Low agency -.027 .490 -1.020 .913 
4.4. Allocation Efficiency 
The results thus far focus on the bidders’ immediate emotions, arousal, and bidding behavior. A 
question of overarching interest is that of outcome efficiency and the differences between markets 
with human and computerized agents. Following Vickrey (1961), we considered an auction to be 
efficient if the bidder with the highest IPV won the auction. In the case of a tie in terms of IPV, the 
auction was efficient if any of the highest IPV bidders won the auction. If bidders submitted the same, 
highest bid, the winner was determined randomly. In such cases, the auction was considered efficient, 
with a weight corresponding to the ex-ante chances of winning the auction for the bidder with the 
highest IPV. Table 6 summarizes the efficiency results for the HA and LA treatment. 
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Table 6. Allocation Efficiency for HA and LA Treatment 
 # efficient # total Efficient Not efficient 
High agency 647.5 720 90% 10% 
Low agency 427  480 89% 11% 
  
Overall, roughly nine out of 10 of the auctions were efficient. Broken down by treatments, the results 
show only little difference. Auctions with high agency were efficient in 89 percent of the cases. 
Auctions with low agency were efficient in 90 percent of the cases. The difference is not significant at 
any conventional level (Chi-squared test, p=.590). It appears that, despite the fact that participants 
were more aroused overall in auctions with high agency, there was little impact on efficiency. Despite 
the lack of significance, this is the first evidence we are aware of that links competition with computer 
opponents, overall arousal, and auction efficiency. While a definitive answer fails to emerge and while 
we do not originally focus on efficiency, it is interesting enough to be addressed in follow-up research 
to study the differences in efficiency in human-only, computer-only, and mixed-market settings. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1. Summary of Results 
Most of the important markets in the world have become electronic. Computerized agents in these 
markets support humans and allow them to focus on other value-added tasks by alleviating the 
attention constraints involved in continuously monitoring market activity. The presence of computer 
agents affects the way humans perceive their environment, which the notion of agency captures. In 
recent years, and beyond cooperative and communicative interaction, computer agents have also 
become competitors to humans (e.g., in trading or auctions) (Brogaard et al., 2014; Hendershott et al., 
2011). In this work, we analyzed the interplay of agency, affective processes, and bidding behavior in 
FPSB auctions in a controlled laboratory experiment in which subjects competed against either 
human participants (high agency) or computerized agents (low agency). 
 
Our economic and physiological results indicate that the intensities of the bidders’ immediate 
emotions in response to different auction events (e.g., submitting a bid) were weaker for low than for 
high agency (H1). Emotional intensity depended on the bidders’ individual valuations and was 
particularly strong in response to winning an auction. Bidders’ overall arousal levels were lower when 
bidding against computerized agents (H2). We found that, overall, bidders submitted lower bids in the 
low- than in the high-agency condition. Moreover, agency and overall arousal affected bidding in 
another, interactive way: while higher degrees of overall arousal were associated with lower bids for 
high agency (H4), this relationship was mostly mitigated in the low-agency treatment (H5). In other 
words, overall arousal indirectly affected bidding behavior, which was conditional on agency: 
computer opponents appeared to mitigate bidders’ emotionality during the auction. 
5.2. Managerial Implications 
From the practical perspective of electronic auction platforms, our study has several implications. 
First, by letting auction participants interact with other humans rather than computer agents, an 
auction platform operator can foster social competition among the participants. Analogously, 
competing against computers has a mitigating effect on the affective processes and their impact on 
behavior. Depending on the context, platform operators can manipulate agency by emphasizing or 
concealing the participation of human peers (e.g., by providing social cues such as usernames and 
profile pictures). For consumer auction platforms where the thrill of beating competitors is a core 
element of the shopping experience and value proposition (Lee et al., 2009b), emphasizing the 
presence of other human bidders can be an important instrument to create a pleasurable shopping 
experience. Another relevant factor in this regard is gender. Prior studies have found virtual humans 
to be more persuasive when matching a subject’s gender (Guadagno et al., 2007) and that female 
users exhibit stronger effects with regard to demographically similar recommendation agents in e-
commerce shopping environments (Qiu & Benbasat, 2010). In our setting, subjects did not know their 
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opponents’ gender. Females, however, submitted higher bids and—similar to the results of Riedl et al. 
(2013) on stress reactions of computer users—exhibited lower intensities of immediate emotions in 
terms of SCR. We did not observe differences in overall arousal. This result may indicate females’ 
less reward-driven nature compared to male bidders, which is reflected in both the former’s higher 
bids and less-pronounced immediate emotions in response to auction events. We did not observe 
interaction effects between gender and the relationships investigated in our research model.  
 
Second, besides the considerations regarding agency, the impact of platform design impact on 
immediate emotions and overall arousal is also an important aspect for attracting and retaining 
customers (Cronin, Brady, & Hult, 2000; Deng & Poole, 2010). In general, emotional experience plays 
an important role for Internet auction site sponsors because it distinguishes them from fixed-price 
competitors (Ariely & Simonson, 2003; Lee et al., 2009b). For bidders in consumer auctions, 
emotional experience can even be seen as a source of hedonic value (Childers, Carr, Peck, & Carson, 
2001). Single design elements of websites can promote or mitigate affective processes in users, 
which, in turn, affect their behavior and general attitude towards the platform (Cronin et al., 2000; 
Deng & Poole, 2010). Menon and Kahn (2002, p. 39) argue that online marketers can use “very 
pleasing, enjoyable stimuli to encourage browsing and receptivity to impulse shopping”. In this sense, 
one should design their platform to be experienced positively to create hedonic value for the customer. 
Auction format is one way to induce immediate emotions. When comparing our results with other 
studies, we can see that different auctions formats are associated with different emotional intensities. 
Adam et al. (2012) found that, in Dutch auctions, the frustration of losing was experienced relatively 
stronger than the respective joy of winning. In contrast, our results, in line with the results of Astor, 
Adam, Jerčić, Schaaff, and Weinhardt (2013), show that the joy of winning a FPSB auction was 
strong. By choosing a specific auction mechanism, auctioneers can, to some extent, control the set of 
immediate emotions a user experiences. By choosing a FPSB auction over a Dutch auction, for 
instance, the market operator might seek to promote the joy of winning and mitigate the experience of 
negative emotions. In addition to Astor et al. (2013), our results show that the bidders experience 
immediate emotions in response to other auction events (e.g., in response to submitting their bid) and 
even more so when interacting with human bidders. Ku (2008, p. 14) argues that, if bidding itself is 
arousing, it can “feed a vicious cycle of bidding and overbidding”. Thus, in dynamic auctions, such 
emotions may eventually promote higher payoffs for the auctioneer. For instance, eBay practices 
such an approach by alerting bidders immediately via email when another bidder has outbidden them. 
 
Third, agency and overall arousal are related to behavioral patterns that the auction platform operator 
can exploit. In particular, bidders seem to engage in socially competitive bidding in high-agency settings 
by trying not only to win the commodity at stake but also to beat their peers. This behavior leads to 
higher margins for the operator since bidders emotionally price in their anticipated joy of winning or 
frustration of losing. In addition to that, bidders in the high-agency setting submit lower bids when more 
aroused, which ultimately results in lower prices for auctions in which bidders with high arousal levels 
compete. Given a high-agency auction setting, marketers may want to manipulate the level of emotional 
behavior to inflate prices. For this purpose, the platform operator can increase or decrease the bidders’ 
arousal by, for example, inducing time pressure, providing social cues for the existence of other human 
bidders (e.g., rankings, profile pictures), or confronting the bidders with thrilling wording and/or visual 
stimuli (e.g., IAPS, Gregor, Lin, Gedeon, Riaz, & Zhu, 2014; Lang, 1995). 
 
On a more general level, our results give reason to believe that the dominance of algorithmic traders 
and high-frequency traders in financial markets does not only affect market efficiency and liquidity 
(Brogaard et al., 2014) per se but also has a direct effect on the human traders’ affective processes 
and behavior. Regulatory authorities and the human traders and the organizations they represent 
should take this finding into account. 
 
Finally, from the perspective of market participants, our results show that their behavior is related to 
their overall arousal. We found no reason to believe that market participants can benefit from an 
awareness and active consideration of this relationship. Since we measured arousal continuously and 
before bid submission, it may well be that providing market participants with real-time biofeedback 
helps them to re-evaluate their decisions (e.g., buy or sell orders, accept or reject an offer) before 
making irreversible decisions with undesired consequences for themselves and the organizations 
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they represent. To this end, professional traders and investors have started using serious games with 
biofeedback to train their emotion-regulation capabilities (Astor et al., 2014; Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 
2012). In this sense, IS design science and human-computer interaction research can provide the 
methods and tools that help market participants to monitor, track, and regulate their emotions during 
bidding to make better decisions (vom Brocke et al., 2013). 
5.3. Theoretical Implications 
This study disentangles competitive arousal and bidding behavior in auctions with different levels of 
agency (i.e., with either human or computerized opponents). Briefly, bidders experience less arousal 
overall and systematically bid lower when facing computer opponents. Theoretically, this finding 
suggests that human behavior is less driven by emotional factors in low-agency settings, which is 
consistent with previous results on bargaining (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & van Winden, 
2007; van't Wout et al., 2006). Arousal and its link to bids are more pronounced when bidding against 
human opponents. In accordance with the literature, we relate this finding to the socially competitive 
nature of auctions (Adam, Krämer, Jähnig, Seifert, & Weinhardt, 2011; Ku et al., 2005) (i.e., bidders 
strive to win a social competition against their peers rather than to merely gain a material surplus). 
Everything else equal, higher arousal is associated with lower bids. Our study demonstrates that this 
finding only holds for the high-agency treatment. Thus, as we outline in our research model, the 
factors agency and arousal interact, where low agency mitigates arousal per se and the relationship 
between arousal and bidding behavior. Moreover, bidding behavior is on average nearly identical for 
both treatments when arousal is not controlled for, which also explains the fact that efficiency is not 
significantly impacted in our setting.  
 
Our analysis shows that the intensities of individuals’ immediate emotions in response to the auction 
outcome and to other events during the auction process are consistently stronger in the high-agency 
environment. The picture is more complex, however, with respect to the impact of the IPV. In general, 
the joy of winning an auction seems to be stronger than the frustration of losing for most IPV classes 
but is reversed for the highest-value classes. This finding provides support for the theories based on 
“equating the reference point with expectations rather than the status quo” (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006, 
p. 1135). We suggest that, based on their individual IPV, the bidders form expectations about the 
auction outcome. Winning an auction with a low valuation is unlikely and, thus, surprisingly positive. 
Similarly, the frustration of losing is undoubtedly stronger if one’s own IPV and, thus, the chances of 
winning are comparatively high ex ante. Our results confirm this notion. We found that the frustration 
of not winning even exceeds the joy of winning for the higher value class slightly. In our regression 
analysis, we accounted for this effect by using the interaction term value class × dummy winner (see 
Table 3). The effect was significant and negative, which reflects the stronger impact of losing a high 
IPV auction. In this regard, our results are contrary to the assumptions of previous research to some 
extent. In the context of common value auctions, van den Bos et al. (2008, p. 488) argue that 
“winning and losing affect utility independent of the monetary consequences of an auction”. Our 
results show, however, that higher nominal payoffs yield stronger immediate emotions. In particular 
for the highest values, the frustration of losing can be stronger than the joy of winning, whereas the 
latter is usually assumed to be the dominating emotion. With regard to agency, we found that high 
agency yields stronger immediate emotions than low agency, and—consistently in both treatments—
winning yields stronger emotional responses than losing. Interestingly, winning against computer 
opponents, however, causes stronger responses than losing against human opponents. On the one 
hand, we can see this finding as an indication that the joy associated with the monetary reward of 
winning an auction (low-agency treatment) outweighs the frustration of losing the inherent social 
competition of auctions (high-agency treatment). On the other hand, however, we can also see it as 
an indication that not only does the joy of winning an auction in the low-agency treatment stem from 
the monetary reward but also that bidders, in fact, also derive joy from beating a computer opponent 
even though to a lower extent than they do for human opponents. This finding is in line with the 
reasoning of Nass and Moon (2000) that computers can take on the role of social actors. 
 
Moreover, the emotions in response to submitting a bid and waiting for the auction outcome are 
experienced more intensely in auctions with human opponents and are positively correlated with the 
individual IPV. At both events, however, the bidder does not receive new information. Theoretically, 
this finding implies that, in those moments, the bidders experience immediate emotions in response 
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to thinking about past or future events (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The immediate emotion in 
response to placing a bid may, for instance, stem from experiencing a fear of losing or, putting it in a 
positive way, from a desire to win the auction, which is more intense for high IPVs. In any case, our 
results show that the bidders already experience emotions during the auction process even though 
their information set is not updated in the sense of auction theory (Krishna, 2002). This finding 
provides a physiological indication for the existence and the intensities of these emotions and, thus, 
yields further insight into the underlying affective processes of humans interacting with electronic 
auction websites and other information systems. Our results show that even seemingly irrelevant 
information events can trigger affective processes in users. Such processes may have important 
ramifications for website and interaction-process design, perception, and success (Cronin et al., 
2000; Deng & Poole, 2010). 
5.4. Limitations and Future Research 
This study has several limitations. First and most importantly, our experiment focused on FPSB 
auctions, which left “no opportunity for competitive fire to escalate with the progression of the auction” 
(van den Bos et al., 2008, p. 484). Our results show that differences in immediate emotions and 
overall arousal already exist in a static, almost clinical environment in which bidders are isolated from 
each other by using dividing blinds and earmuffs and only interact very indirectly by exchanging 
sealed bids. Thus, we need to further investigate and contrast the differences in affective processes 
and bidding behavior in more dynamic auctions (e.g., Japanese, Dutch, or Dollar auctions) (Adam et 
al., 2011; Ku et al., 2005). Moreover, the bidders submitted single bids in FPSB auctions. Future 
research may, therefore, also take affective processes in response to repeated bidding in the same 
auction into account to address effects of pseudo-endowment (Ariely & Simonson, 2003) and bidders’ 
attachment (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006). Finally, with the increasing share of automated trading in stock 
market activity in general, comparing the results of our study with market decision making in 
continuous double auctions could yield promising findings for financial markets. 
 
Second, our study does not consider graphical representations of the bidders, which certainly is an 
important factor for the role of agency in competitive human-agent interaction (Benbasat, Dimoka, 
Pavlou, & Qiu, 2010; Davis, Murphy, Owens, Khazanchi, & IIze, 2009; Fox et al., forthcoming; 
Nunamaker, Derrick, Elkins, Burgoon, & Patton, 2011; Riedl, Mohr, Kenning, & Davis, 2011; Riedl et 
al., 2014b). In this regard, several prior studies explicitly disentangle the influence of agency and 
graphical representations with important implications for emotions and behavior in the context of 
cooperative and communicative tasks in virtual environments (Appel et al., 2012; Guadagno et al., 
2007; Nowak & Biocca, 2003; von der Pütten et al., 2010). In our study, we deliberately decided to not 
use graphical representations since, in electronic auctions, the bidders usually remain anonymous 
and do not see photos or avatars representing the other bidders (Steinhart et al., 2013)10. However, 
beyond the role of recommender agents that provide consumers with advice on products (Benbasat 
et al., 2010), some entertainment shopping platforms have actually begun to use avatars or other 
forms of graphical representations (e.g., dealdash.com) to boost social competition. Therefore, 
varying the appearance of the human bidders (and also the computerized agents) in a controlled and 
traceable way seems promising to disentangle the effects related to agency from those related to 
social cues (e.g., by displaying actual photos or stylized representations). To approach the inherently 
interwoven influences of representation and agency, two approaches come to mind (von der Pütten et 
al., 2010). The threshold model of social influence (Blascovich et al., 2002) states that social 
verification is achieved (and, hence, social reactions are triggered) if either the users’ perception of 
agency is high or low agency is compensated by higher behavioral realism. The ethopoeia concept 
(Nass & Moon, 2000), in contrast, denies agency as a relevant factor outright and holds that social 
reactions are evoked if only there are sufficient social cues, such as natural speech, interactivity, or 
the filling of social roles. We acknowledge that further investigating the interplay of agency and 
graphical representations is due. Despite the high importance of graphical representations with 
respect to the effects of agency, our results indicate that, even without social cues, agency proves to 
be a critical factor, which we find to be reflected in more intense immediate emotions and arousal (H1, 
H2), higher bids (H3), and a stronger relation between arousal and bidding behavior (H4, H5). 
10 The perceptible digital representation of a computational algorithm is usually referred to as agent, while the perceptible digital 
representation of a human is referred to as avatar (Bailenson & Blascovich, 2004). 
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A third limitation is that, although our analysis reveals a mediating role of overall arousal, we cannot 
draw a reliable conclusion about causality from arousal to bids. Even though we measured arousal in 
the time frame six to three seconds before the bid was submitted, it might well be that subjects 
intended to submit a particularly low bid and then—because of the thrilling thought about the potential 
gains—became more aroused, and eventually submitted their bid according to their initial plan. It is 
striking though that the relationship between arousal and bids disappeared when the bidders face 
computer opponents. To further disentangle this effect, future research may induce different levels of 
arousal independent of the auction process, which may be achieved, for instance, by letting subjects 
play an arousing game, listen to arousing music, or experience stress prior to engaging in the 
auctions (Riedl, Kindermann, Auinger, & Javor, 2012; Riedl et al., 2013). 
 
A fourth limitation is that our analysis of overall arousal and immediate emotions is limited to HR and 
SCR measurements. Taking into account respiration would potentially increase the explanatory power 
of our analysis and capture further important aspects (Laude, Weise, Girard, & Elghozi, 1995). Due to 
the nature of our experiment that required the presence of at least three participants in the laboratory 
at the same time, we were limited in the amount of physiological parameters and, therefore, focused 
particularly on HR and SCR. Moreover, and complementary to the analysis of objective physiological 
parameters, it would be interesting to additionally collect subjective data based on ex post interviews 
(Gallagher et al., 2002) or surveys (Ortiz de Guinea et al., 2013) to shed more light on (1) the bidders’ 
cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive load, strategies, and motives) and (2) the bidders’ perceived 
valence of overall arousal and immediate emotions. By combining subjective and objective measures, 
future research can disentangle the influence of agency on bidders’ cognitive and affective processes 
and determine to what extent these processes are conscious or unconscious in nature (Fox et al., 
forthcoming). Providing strong evidence for the importance of unconscious processes in the context 
of agency, Fox et al. (forthcoming, p. 25) found in a meta-analysis of 32 studies that “objective 
measures revealed greater differences for agency than subjective measures”. Thus, using 
electroencephalography as an objective measure of cognitive load and valence (Gregor et al., 2014; 
Ortiz de Guinea et al., 2013) seems to be a promising complementary approach in this context. 
5.5. Conclusions 
Taken as a whole, our study shows that the intensity of bidders’ immediate emotions and overall arousal 
and the relationship between arousal and bidding behavior is mitigated if agency is low (i.e., when 
bidding against computerized agents rather than human opponents). Both electronic market platform 
operators and bidders should be aware of this relationship and consider it during market design and 
when competing against other bidders—human or not. Given that some of the world’s most important 
markets contain both human and computerized agents, understanding the impact of agency on bidding 
behavior and overall market parameters is not only of academic but also of industrial, regulatory, and 
societal interest. With respect to technological progress, we have reason to believe that interaction 
between humans and computerized agents will become increasingly important in business processes 
and also in daily life. We believe that neuroIS research can contribute to a better understanding of the 
underlying affective processes and, thereby, support the decision making process. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Supplementary Material 
Different Windows Sizes for Arousal Computation 
In the analysis, we used the time window of six to three seconds before submitting a bid for 
computing overall arousal (i.e., a time window of three seconds and a buffer of three seconds (3+3)). 
In the following analysis, we test the robustness of our results by using different window sizes for 
computing arousal. Table A-1 and Table A-2 summarize a set of GLS regression models for arousal 
and bids with different window size for arousal. The results are consistent across the different 
windows sizes. 
 
Table A-1. GLS Regression Models for Overall Arousal with Different Window Sizes 
Independent variables 
Overall arousal (window size for overall arousal) 
(1+5) (2+4) (3+3) (4+2) (5+1) 




























































 N = 1506 R² = .047 
N = 1506 
R² = .049 
N = 1506 
R² = .051 
N = 1506 
R² = .052 
N = 1506 
R² = .054 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table A-2. GLS Regression Models for Bids with Different Window Sizes for Overall Arousal 
Independent variables 
Bid (window size for overall arousal) 
(1 + 5) (2 + 4) (3 + 3) (4 + 2) (5 + 1) 
















































































 N = 1506 R² = .734 
N = 1506 
R² = .735 
N = 1506 
R² = .736 
N = 1506 
R² = .736 
N = 1506 
R² = .737 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix B: Participants Instructions 
[We include on the following pages English translations of the instructions. Please note that the 
instructions are only translations for information; they are not intended for publication or to be used in 
the lab. The instructions in the original language were carefully polished in grammar, style, 
comprehensibility, and avoidance of strategic guidance.] 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment of economic decision making. During the experiment, 
your skin conductance, pulse, and heart rate are recorded. You can earn real money in this 
experiment. How much money you earn depends on both your decisions and the decisions of the 
other participants in this room [the computerized bidding agents]. The experiment consists of 30 
consecutive auctions. The experimental software manages a cash account for you that balances 
gains and losses out of the 30 auctions. A positive cash balance is paid to you at the end of the 
experiment, a negative one is claimed. During the experiment gains and losses are calculated in 
monetary units (MU). 16 MU equal a real amount of 1 Euro (EUR). 1 MU therefore equals 6.25 Cents. 
Communication between participants is not allowed. 
 
Design of an Auction 
In each auction you bid for a fictitious asset. Information about your personal resale value of the asset 
is given to you prior to an auction. This value is known only to you. Within each auction you and two 
other participants [computerized bidding agents] compete in an auction. [The computerized bidding 
agents follow a strategy that you do not know.] The two other bidders also receive their personal 
resale value prior to the auction and it is known only to them. 
 
As soon as the auction starts you have the possibility to place your bid via a number pad. If you 
make a mistake you can correct your bid through clicking on the “Correct” button. It deletes the last 
digit you entered. You finally place your bid by clicking on “Submit bid” (cf. Figure B-1). [The 
computerized bidding agents bid simultaneously and do not know about other bids.] 
 
 
Figure B-1. Number Pad, Correction, and Bid Placement 
 
If all bidders made their bid, the one with the highest bid is determined. This bidder wins the auction 
and pays the price he or she bid for the asset. If two or more bidders place the same highest bid, the 
experimental software selects one of them by equal chances. If you are not the highest bidder you 
receive a payoff of zero. If you are the highest bidder your payoff is calculated in the following way: 
 
Payoff = Personal Resale Value – Price 
 
The Personal Resale Value 
Prior to every auction you and the other participants [computerized bidding agents] receive 
information about their personal resale value but not about the resale value of the others. In each 
auction you exactly know how high your personal resale value is in the particular auction.  
 
The personal resale value is drawn independently out of the integer values between 11 and 110 for 
each bidder. Every value is equally likely to be chosen. This corresponds to an urn with 100 balls 
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which are labeled with numbers from 11 to 110. A random draw from the urn determines the resale 
value of the bidder’s asset. After the draw the ball is put back into the urn and the resale value for the 
next bidder is drawn. 
 
The winner of an auction obtains her personal resale value minus her bid. This connection should be 
explained through an example. Assume that you have a personal resale value of 65 MU and you 
have been the bidder with the highest bid. Then there are the following cases: 
 
1. Your bid lies above your resale value, e.g. 67 MU  
 Loss of 65MU – 67MU = -2MU 
2. Your bid equals your resale value, i.e. 65 MU  
 Zero payoff: 65MU – 65MU = 0MU 
3. Your bid lies below your resale value, e.g. 61 MU  
 Gain of 65MU – 61MU = 4MU 
If one of the other participants (computerized bidding agents) is the highest bidder, the auction ends 
and you receive a payoff of zero. 
 
Course of the Experiment 
After the instruction phase there are five practice periods with five auctions to gain a better 
understanding of the experiment. Gains and losses out of these practice periods are not considered 
for the later payoff. After the practice periods there is a five-minute resting period where a fixation 
cross appears on the computer screen. The resting period is essential for the physiological 
measurement and later data analysis. Stay calm during this phase and try to move as little as 
possible. 
 
The main course of the experiment consists of 30 consecutive periods where each of the six 
participants plays against two other participants (computerized bidding agents). In every period you 
and the other participants [computerized bidding agents] of your group participate in one auction as 
described above. After every period you are randomly re-matched to a new group of three bidders. 
Thus, you will play against frequently changing participants [computerized bidding agents]. The result 
of one auction does not affect following auctions. [Please note that the other five participants in this 
room do not have any influence on your auction outcome including gains and losses. Six participants 
are present because this laboratory has six places.] 
 
Payment 
At the end of the 30 periods a positive cash balance is paid to you and a negative one is claimed. The 
cash balance in MU is multiplied with a factor of 1/16 to get the payoff in Euro. I.e. if you have a cash 
balance of 400 MU you obtain a payment of 25 EUR. 1 MU equals 6.25 Cents. 
 
... and finally, some comments 
If you have any questions regarding the experiment, please remain seated, raise your hand and wait 
until the experimenter approaches you. Then, ask your question as quiet as possible. Utilize only your 
free hand to interact with the experiment system. The hand linked to the physiological measurement 
system must remain as calm as possible during the whole experiment. Try to avoid every movement 
as this can distort the measurement. Upon the end of the experiment, remain seated and wait until 
the experimenter has removed the electrodes from your arm and wrist. The participant instructions 
remain at your place. 
 
Before the experiment starts you are going to answer some questions of general understanding about 
the rules of the experiment on your computer screen. Then, five practice periods are performed as 
described above. Gains and losses are not considered here. Then the five-minute resting period 
starts and therewith the actual experiment. 
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Important note: Please click your mouse as quiet as possible and with little effort. You will now be 
equipped with earmuffs to reduce the influence of background noise. 
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Appendix C: List of Acronyms 
ANS autonomic nervous system 
E1 auction event 1 (bid submit) 
E2 auction event 2 (waiting for results) 
E3 auction event 3 (winner information) 
ECG electrocardiogram 
EDA electrodermal activity 
FPSB first-price sealed-bid 
HA high agency 
IAPS international affective picture system 
IE indirect effect 
IPV independent private value 
LA low agency 
LL95%CI lower limit of the 95% confidence interval 
µS microsiemens 
SCL skin conductance level 
SCR skin conductance response 
SCR.amp skin conductance response amplitude 
UL95%CI upper limit of the 95% confidence interval 
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